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Abstract
In this paper, we address the pass-through from money and capital
market interest rates to bank retail rates in Germany for the period Jan-
uary 2003 to December 2006 using a panel of almost 200 banks. In ad-
dition, banks' heterogeneous price setting behaviour is analysed by in-
vestigating the kind of attributes of a credit institution in terms of its
balance sheet characteristics and its institutional arrangements that alter
its adjustment process. The main conclusions are the incompleteness of
pass-through in both the short and the long run and the existence of con-
siderable heterogeneity across retail products and banks. Both maturity
and loan size matter in determining the degree of pass-through as well
as whether products are targeted at rms or households. Banks' balance
sheet structure has a sizeable impact on the speed and magnitude of their
adjustment. Large, illiquid, less diversied credit institutes and those
heavily involved in interbank lending change their rates more rapidly and
incorporate more of a change in market conditions in their rates in the
long run. Even the dierent banking groups that are peculiar to Germany
adjust their rates not in a uniform manner, but savings banks and credit
cooperatives adjust their rates more slowly than the remaining banks.
PhD student, School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham,
University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. Email: lexseim@nottingham.ac.uk.1 Introduction
In order to accomplish the mandate given to the European Central Bank (ECB)
by the European Monetary Union Member States, it is vital that it fully un-
derstands the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the euro area. The
area constitutes a newly formed entity and consequently the ECB did not know
a priori how its policy would exactly aect each link in the chain of eects that
make up the monetary transmission process. The rst and second of these links
revolve around the euro money market that as a result plays a central role in the
transmission mechanism. The money market actually consists of two markets:
The primary market is the place where central banks execute their policy by
ensuring that the banking system is always short of liquidity. This gives the
ECB a lever because it has the monopoly in providing banks in the euro area
with liquidity. In the secondary market, banks have the possibility to acquire
funds from each other when they are in need of funding. These two links in the
transmission process concern rstly the impact of monetary policy modica-
tions, i.e. a change in the key policy rate, on money market rates and secondly
the eect movements in these rates have on retail bank rates. The latter are the
interest rates set by commercial banks on loans, mortgages and deposits and
therefore aect consumption and investment decisions by consumers and busi-
nesses. Without a complete pass-through of ocial policy changes to these retail
rates, monetary policy will be inecient in inuencing spending and, eventually,
ination. However, not only a comprehensive knowledge about the magnitude
of the pass-through but also information about the speed of adjustment of retail
rates to market rate modications is essential for an informed monetary policy
decision.
Much of the previous literature regarding interest rate pass-through uses
a panel error correction model (ECM), but studies dier in their theoretical
foundations. De Bondt's ECM (2002), for example, is based on a marginal
cost pricing framework including asymmetric information and switching costs
following Rousseas (1985). His analysis of ve deposit and four lending rates for
the euro area as a whole comes to the conclusion that immediate pass-through
is rather incomplete contrary to nal pass-through. The 2002 cross-country
study of euro area member states of De Bondt et al. relates the rates on loans
and deposit { in separate estimation equations { to market rates of relevant
maturity and is based on the prot-maximising framework of a Monti-Klein
bank. Their results indicate that the returns on deposits are less responsive
to market conditions than the prices put on loan products. Weth (2002), who
investigates the pass-through of ve lending rates, uses the same theoretical
foundations but his is the only study in this brief review to exclusively analyse
German rates, which he does for the period April 1993 to December 2000.
In Germany, pass-through was highest for mortgage loans, which was nearly
complete, and only around 50% for current account credit. The situation in
the UK, however, seems completely dierent. Hofmann and Mizen (2004) use a
Monti-Klein model to explain the dierences in pass-through on thirteen deposit
and mortgage rates of UK banks and building societies and nd that whereas
deposit rates adjust fully in the long run, mortgage rates do not.
Most papers written on this topic focus exclusively on the pricing side (ex-
cept, for example, Weth, 2002) and thus presuppose that banks react uniformly
to a policy change. In other words, these studies have not taken into account
2that bank-specic characteristics might lead to a heterogeneous response. In
particular, the structure of banks' balance sheets might have an eect on their
adjustment process. This is related to the idea that credit institutes dier in
their ability to access alternative means of funds following a monetary tight-
ening that causes an increase in their renancing costs. The credit channel of
the monetary transmission mechanism oers one explanation for their dier-
ing ability, namely that capital markets are characterised by imperfections and
banks suer from informational asymmetries which lead to moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. Because of these a credit institute has to pay an ex-
ternal nance premium which stands in relation to its nancial structure. This
is the concept inherent in a sub-channel of the credit channel: the bank-lending
channel which emphasises the heterogeneous behaviour of Monetary Financial
Institutes (MFIs) in relation to their loan supply following a monetary con-
traction. Common attributes used in this literature are banks' liquidity, their
capital and size.
Therefore, this paper rstly analyses the pass-through of changes in market
rates onto retail bank rates in Germany during the period January 2003 to
December 2006 and secondly takes account of a credit institution's balance
sheet characteristics. To this end, the new harmonised MFI interest rate (MIR)
statistics is used which oers the opportunity for bank-level analysis and has
several advantages concerning the investigation of interest rate pass-through.
This study is the rst to make use of these new statistics to examine long
and short-run pass-through in Germany which is done within a panel ECM
framework. In order to empirically investigate the impact of balance sheet
factors an entirely new data set was constructed matching banks' individual
retail rates on dierent loan and deposit products from the MIR statistics with
their balance sheets and prot and loss accounts. Then balance sheet indicators
are calculated for each bank. Based on the distribution of these indicators, three
bank categories are set up with a similar number of banks in each category.
Long-run pass-through rates and short-run elasticities are estimated for each
category and the dierence between the top and bottom one is calculated and
its signicance tested.
This study thus contributes to the literature by combining the approaches
of the bank lending channel and pass-through literatures, by being the rst
to use the new MFI interest rate statistics for this purpose, by creating a new
comprehensive dataset in the process and nally by providing a detailed analysis
of the interest rate setting behaviour of German banks.
The main conclusions are the incompleteness of pass-through in both the
short and the long run and the existence of considerable heterogeneity across
retail products and banks. Both maturity and loan size matter in determining
the degree of pass-through as well as whether products are targeted at rms
or households. Balance sheet characteristics have a sizeable and signicant
impact on retail rate adjustment following changes in the market rate. Large,
illiquid, less diversied credit institutes and those heavily involved in interbank
lending alter their rates more rapidly and incorporate more of a change in market
conditions in their rates in the long run.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of the
theoretical background. Section 3 provides a brief description of the data and
the construction of the data set, whereas section 4 illuminates the methodology.
Section 5 presents the results and the nal section concludes.
32 The adapted Monti-Klein imperfect competi-
tion model in the banking sector
Banks here are dened as nancial intermediaries that buy funds, namely de-
posits, and sell them to borrowers1. This results in a supply of deposits D by
the public and a demand for loans L by borrowers, whom the bank views as a
homogenous group. Indeed, it is supposed that banks face an upward-sloping
aggregate supply of deposits and a downward-sloping aggregate demand curve
for loans, i.e. there is imperfect competition in the banking market. The result-
ing supply and demand functions D(rD) and L(rL), where rD is the return on
deposits and rL is the price put on loan products, are more conveniently written
in their inverse forms rL(L) and rD(D) for the following analysis. Furthermore,
we assume that banking technology is given which implies that the cost of han-
dling deposits and loans is characterised by function C(D;L). There are N
banks (indexed by n = 1;:::;N) all using this same technology. The balance
sheet of bank n has Dn on the liability side and Ln and interbank balances Mn
on the asset side. The balance sheet identity therefore reads as
Dn = Ln + Mn: (1)
Mn are the net position of a bank on the interbank market, where the interest
rate m is exogenous to the bank.




















which using Equation (1) can be rewritten as the sums of the intermediation



























The unique Cournot equilibrium has each bank setting D
n = D=N and
L
n = L=N and is characterised by an N-tuple vector (D
n;L
n)n=1;:::;N.
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+ m   rD(D)   C0
D(D;L) = 0: (5)
1This section follows Freixas and Rochet (1997).
4Solving for the optimal loan and deposit rate and assuming a linear cost












+ m   !D: (7)
From this, it can be seen that in perfect competition where N ! 1 the loan
and deposit intermediation margins equal their respective marginal costs. As the
banking sector, however, becomes oligopolistic and N gets smaller, the deposit
intermediation margin falls (since r0
D > 0) whereas the loan intermediation
margin rises (since r0
L < 0) (Lim, 2001). The equations for the optimal retail
rates also describe the two fundamental relationships between these rates given
the exogenous market rate m. They are the long-run cointegrating relationships
which will be mentioned again in the empirical analysis. Rewriting the optimal
lending and deposit rates, we obtain
r
L = !1 + 1m; (8)
r
D = !2 + 2m; (9)
where










!1 and !2 can be seen as constant loan and deposit intermediation margins,
whereas 1 and 2 measure the eect of a change in the market rate on the
retail rate. This was assumed to be a one-for-one eect in the previous analysis,
which is what most of the literature assumes. We are going to test this so-called
completeness hypothesis in section 5.
From the equation for the optimal lending rate, we can also see that in
the absence of costs, the marginal return on loans is equal to the exogenously
given money market interest rate, which reects the marginal yield of a risk free
investment (Klein, 1971). Another result that follows from this model is that
when costs are assumed to be additive, the pricing on loan products and the
determination of the return on deposits are independent of each other. In other
words, the optimal loan (deposit) rate is independent of the characteristics of
the deposit (loan) market (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). This rather important
assumption is employed in the literature to justify the use of separate equations
for lending and deposit rate determination2.
2Neumark and Sharpe (1992), De Bondt (2002) and Mojon (2000) are among those esti-
mating lending and deposit rate pass-through separately.
53 Data
The data covers the sample period January 2003 to December 2006 and con-
stitutes monthly data. There are 197 banks of dierent size and from dierent
sectors and regions in the MFI interest rate (MIR) statistics { 8:5 per cent
of the German banking population { which cover 65 per cent of the business
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004). The MIR statistics, introduced in January 2003,
are a harmonised euro-area wide representation of interest rates and new busi-
ness volumes for loans and deposits. They constitute a major improvement for
the analysis of interest rate pass-through since they contain interest rates that
are the eective rates paid or received by bank customers instead of advertised
ones. 28 of the 31 rates that make up the statistics are analysed in this paper:
ten deposit rates and 18 lending rates.
In order to empirically investigate the impact of balance sheet factors on
interest rate pass-through we constructed an entirely new data set matching
banks' individual retail rates on dierent loan and deposit products from the
MIR statistics with their balance sheets and prot and loss accounts. All three
statistics were accessed during a research visit to the Deutsche Bundesbank.
In addition to these condential data, publicly available money and capital
market interest rates are employed. These market rates used to analyse the
pass-through to bank rates were chosen consistent with comparable maturity
which follows the cost of funds approach. This selects the exogenous market
rate according to the maturity structure of the corresponding retail rate. This
approach has banks setting their rates in relation to their marginal costs, i.e.
market rates represent the cost of funds for deposit rates and the opportunity
cost for lending rates (Kok Srensen and Werner, 2006). EONIA and the three-
month EurIBOR rates3 were used as money market rates, whereas for retail
rates of long maturity the long-term capital market interest rates chosen were
German bearer debt securities. All market rates are average monthly rates.
4 Methodology
4.1 Estimation of the long-run pass-through level and the
short-run elasticity
A common representation of the dynamic lending rate determination process in
the literature is the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL)4 model, which relies
on the assumption that there is a stationary long-run relationship between the
two interest rates.






qmt q + "i;t (10)
Here, the retail interest rate of bank i at time t, ri;t, is related to four of
its own lags, the contemporaneous market rate and four lags of the market rate
which represent retail rate rigidities. ci is a bank-specic eect and captures the
individual mark-ups !1 and !2 of section 2 depending on whether ri;t relates
3From now on the three-month EurIBOR rate will be abbreviated to Euribor3.
4See, for example, Kremers et al. (1992) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).
6to a loan or deposit product. The ADL model can be rewritten in its error
correction model (ECM) form:
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or expressed dierently as






qmt q + ui;t 1 + "i;t: (12)
The ECM provides a convenient way to show both short-run dynamics and
the long-run relationship. The stability of the former requires the sum of the 
coecients to be positive and the sum of the  coecients to be smaller than
one. These are stationarity conditions of the equilibrium mark-up. In Equation
(11), the change in the retail rate depends on a bank specic eect, three lagged
endogenous retail rate changes, one contemporary and three lagged exogenous
market rate changes. The long-run relationship between retail rate and market
rate is captured by ', whereas  represents the loading coecient of the ECM
which provides information on the speed of adjustment to a temporary devi-
ation from the level relationship. This cointegrating relationship corresponds
to theoretical Equations (8) and (9) of the optimal lending and deposit rates.
ui;t 1 in Equation (12) is the residual of this relation.
The short-run response of the retail rate to a change in the market rate is
calculated from the coecients of the ECM and is measured in terms of a one-
month pass-through elasticity which indicates how many per cent of a simulated
change in the market rate is in the retail rate after one month. In period t = 1,
Equation (11) reads
ri;1 = 0m1 + (ri;0   'm0) (13)
as the higher order lags disappear. Now assume that both the market and the
retail rate are initially 0, i.e. ri;0 = m0 = 0. Then a permanent change in the
market rate from 0 to 1 (m1 = 0) is simulated. If these values are put in
Equation (13), you obtain ri;1 = 0. In period t = 2, the ECM is
ri;2 = 1ri;1 + 0m2 + 1m1 + (ri;1   'm1): (14)
Subsequently, let the market rate stay at m2 = 1, so that there is no further
change. Placing m2 = 0 and ri;1 = 0 into (14) results in
ri;2 = 10 + 1 + (0   '): (15)
The one-month pass-through is the cumulative change in the retail rate, meaning
the current change (ri;1) in addition to the change after one month (ri;2):
ri;1 + ri;2 = 0 + 10 + 1 + (0   '): (16)
74.2 Estimation of the impact of balance sheet indicators
For the purpose of investigating the impact of balance sheet factors on inter-
est rate pass-through, variables from the Deutsche Bundesbank's balance sheet
statistics and prot and loss accounts are used to calculate a number of char-
acteristics for each bank. These are average indicators, i.e. they are averaged
over the whole sample period and changes in an MFI's balance sheet structure
during this time are not considered5. Each indicator is then taken separately
and based on its distribution three bank categories are set up with a roughly
similar number of banks in each category. This implies that for the character-
istic size, for example, larger banks are in the top category whereas small MFIs
are in the bottom one.
In order to estimate a heterogeneous pass-through response, dummy vari-
ables for the upper (Ui) and lower (Li) categories are constructed:
Ui =
(





1 if i belongs to lower category
0 otherwise
: (18)
After introducing these dummies the long-run relationship of a two-step model
reads
ri;t = i + 'mt + U
i Ui + 'UmtUi + L
i Li + 'LmtLi: (19)
And the ECM is
























+ ui;t 1 + Uui;t 1Ui + Lui;t 1Li + "i;t: (20)
Writing the long-run relationship and the ECM in such a way allows essen-
tially three dierent long-run pass-through rates and short-run elasticities to
be estimated: one each for category one, two and three. In our specication
category two is the reference category, so its long-run pass-through rate is '
and its short-run elasticity is simulated in Equation (16). The pass-through
levels of interest now are, however, those of the top and bottom category. Their
respective long-run rates are dened as ' + 'U and ' + 'L. The short-run
elasticity of category 1 is given by
(0 + U
0 ) + (1 + U
1 )  (0 + U
0 ) + (1 + U
1 ) + ( + U)  (0 + U
0 )
  ( + U)  (' + 'U) (21)
5Since the time period under consideration covers four years, the assumption that no fun-
damental changes in a bank's balance sheet structure took place seems not overly restrictive.
8and of category 3 by
(0 + L
0 ) + (1 + L
1 )  (0 + L
0 ) + (1 + L
1 ) + ( + L)  (0 + L
0 )
  ( + L)  (' + 'L): (22)
These regressions are run for each category and the short-run elasticities and
the long-run response are calculated. Since we are interested in the dierence
between the upper (X3) and lower (X1) category values, they are tested under
the null hypothesis:
H0 : X3   X1 = 0: (23)
Valid inferences about the signicance of the above hypothesis can be made
because one of the properties of this specication is that parameters and the
variance-covariance matrix are jointly estimated.
The xed-eects estimator was chosen as estimation method. This allows for
the individual eect i to capture the bank-specic loan and deposit intermedi-
ation margins, !1 and !2, and assumes that banks' interest rate setting diers
only in this margin, so that the model coecients are jointly estimated for all
banks. The Nickell bias due to the dynamic nature of the model should not be
of great concern here as Judson and Owen (1999) showed that when T  30
the xed eects or least squares dummy variable estimator \performs just as
well or better than the viable alternatives" GMM one-step and two-step in an
unbalanced panel. Here, T is 48.
Equations with several dierent lag structures were estimated for each retail
rate. Reported in the next section are models with three lags for most retail
rates which proved the most parsimonious.6
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Pass-through of all banks
Equation (12) was estimated for each retail rate and Table 1 presents the re-
sults for all banks. Standard errors were calculated using the Delta-Method7.
The most striking feature is that pass-through is far from complete and highly
heterogeneous across banking products. Therefore the completeness hypothesis
can be rejected; in other words there is no one-for-one response of retail rates to
changes in market rates. Long-run adjustment rates are almost always highly
signicant and range from 6% for deposits redeemable at a period of notice of
up to three months8 to 94% for the rate on loans over e1 million with a oating
rate or an initial rate xation of up to one year. The short-run transmission
parameter is often higher than the long-term rate, especially for deposits.
6Exceptions are household and rm deposits with agreed maturity of over one and up to
two years, housing and other loans with an initial rate xation of over one and up to ve
years, as well as rm loans both up and over e1 million with an initial rate xation of over
one and up to ve years whose estimation models all included two lags. Housing loans with
an initial rate xation of over ve and up to ten years had four lags included.
7*** indicate signicance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Regarding the market
rate, Bearer stands for German bearer debt securities.
8The lowest pass-through was recorded for this rate at 1% but was insignicant.
9Results for these products are shown in the top half of Table 1. They exhibit
a hump-shaped pattern with regard to maturity for both households and rms:
Pass-through is low for overnight deposits, rises with increasing maturity and
falls again for deposits with agreed maturity of over two years. So long-run
adjustment for overnight deposits of households is only 27%, 75% and nearly
80% for deposits with agreed maturity up to one year and for over one and up to
two years respectively, and just 44% for over two years. A possible reason for this
pattern might be that with rising maturity of products monitoring costs for the
banks amplify so that they feel safer pricing closer to market terms. The sluggish
adjustment of deposits with xed maturity over two years might be explained
by the fact that this type of deposits is not very important to banks in terms of
volumes. In the short run the same hump-shaped pattern emerges as in the long
run. However, the short-run elasticities are often larger than the long-run pass-
through parameters. This might be due to banks anticipating rate changes and
pricing them in in advance. For deposits to rms, long-run and short-run pass-
through rates follow the same pattern as for households, i.e. they are low for
overnight deposits, rise with increasing maturity and are small again for two-year
deposits; however, banks seem to adjust their rates for products targeted at rms
faster and to a greater extent than products aimed at households. Redeemable
deposits adjust extremely sluggishly, especially products redeemable at a period
of notice up to three months (1%), but they have the only long-run coecients
(for deposits) not to be signicant at any conventional level. In the short run,
there is considerably higher pass-through for deposits redeemable at a period of
notice up to three months than in the long-run.
The lower half of Table 1 shows the results for loans9. Monetary Finan-
cial Institutes impart only around 50% of a change in the market rate to the
rate applied to overdrafts to households. Pass-through on overdrafts to rms
are astoundingly low { considering it is such an important product { at 29%
in the long-run and 20% after one month. Housing loans exhibit the highest
adjustment rates ranging from 46% to 86% in the long run and again increasing
with rising maturity. Even after only one month, banks have incorporated up to
86% of a market rate change in their retail rate. Rates on other credit respond
more sluggishly with around 40% to 50% long-run adjustment. For products
in this band with either a oating rate or xed up to one year pass-through is
substantially higher in the short run (up to 98%). Loans to corporations up to
e1 million have long-run adjustment rates lying between 46% to 68%. Contrary
to the pattern found for deposits, pass-through here falls with rising maturity in
both the long and the short term. MFIs very quickly pass on changes in market
terms to loans over e1 million as the comparatively high pass-through levels of
94% to 55% show. For loans over e1 million with an initial rate xation of up to
one year or with a oating rate, banks again `overadjust' after one month. How-
ever, in this instance the reference market rate is Euribor3 and mostly when the
short-run pass-through was found to be larger than the long-run one, Euribor3
was also used as reference.
9The results for consumer credit rates are not reported here due to the signicant hetero-
geneity of products summarised in these bands.
105.2 Pass-through of separate banking groups
The German banking system is characterised by three dierent major banking
groups, namely saving banks, credit cooperatives and commercial banks. The
latter shall be loosely referred to as other banks in the following and they also
include the so-called Grobanken, i.e. Germany's larger well-known banks. Most
savings banks and especially cooperatives are rather small and have very strong
inter-bank links with their head institutions. Since banks in these two groups
are not strictly prot-maximising entities, it might be supposed that they price
dierently and have a distinct interest rate pass-through to other banks. In
order to test whether the various groups do exhibit dierent pricing structures,
the regressions were also run for banking groups separately.
The results indicate that there are indeed substantial dierences across
groups. Other banks price closest to market terms generally having higher short
and long-term pass-throughs than all banks. Most notably, their prices adjust
almost always faster for products targeted at rms. Savings banks adjust their
rates mostly to a lesser extent and more slowly than other banks, but no clear
pattern emerges when their price adjustment is compared to those of coopera-
tives. The latter have a lower average long-run pass-through rate than the rest
of the banks.
5.3 Heterogeneous adjustment
As mentioned previously banks may react heterogeneously to alterations in the
market rate and their responsiveness is related to their nancial structure. A
monetary contraction causes money and capital market interest rates to increase.
Some MFIs are in a superior position to oset this rise in their cost of funds
due to the characteristics of their balance sheets.
Liquidity is of particular importance in this context since a liquid bank is
able to draw on its liquid assets following a worsening of market conditions. It
may thus feel less pressurised to adjust its rates swiftly. The bank lending chan-
nel literature conrms that liquidity inuences banks' response to alterations
in monetary conditions. Ehrmann et al. (2001) even nd it to be the most
signicant characteristic to explain distributional eects across credit institutes
in their lending response. Worms (2001) nds that the loan supply of German
banks with a higher liquidity ratio falls less than that of illiquid MFIs, which
is echoed by Kashyap and Stein (2000) for the US and Gambacorta (2005b) for
Italy. The latter author furthermore shows that a signicant reduction in liquid
assets follows a monetary tightening proving that banks draw down these assets
facing adverse market conditions. Gambacorta (2005a) arrives at the result that
lending rates by liquid banks are stickier. Liquidity is dened as cash in hand
plus balances with central banks plus Treasury bills, Treasury discount paper
and similar debt instruments issued by public bodies and eligible for renancing
plus debt instruments plus shares and other variable yield securities.
A monetary tightening also leads to a fall in the deposit base of MFIs as
their customers substitute away from deposits to securities which now yield a
higher return. Banks then have to resort to more costly ways of renancing as
Kashyap and Stein (1995) argue that banking rms are just as prone to adverse
selection problems as rms and thus face an external nance premium. The
informational asymmetries in the market mean that some banks are better able
11to raise alternative funds than others. Size is often cited in the bank lending
channel literature as an important factor as a bank's size is an indicator of
how much it suers from informational asymmetry problems. A small credit
institute is more prone to adverse selection and moral hazard problems than a
large institute and has a relatively simple capital structure. It therefore faces a
greater external nance premium. Additionally, a bank's size reects its ability
to access alternative sources of nance. A large MFI has many more instruments
at its disposal and can access markets unavailable to small ones. It is thus
better placed to raise alternative funds and can therefore aord to wait with
the adjustment of its product prices. In other words, it has scope for interest rate
smoothing. Alternatively, it may be that if a bank's customer structure is related
to its size, i.e. big MFIs serve big rms which are themselves able to access the
market for funds, then large banks compete directly with market terms and
have to react swiftly. On the other hand, size might not be as important in
Germany anyway since most small banks are savings and cooperative banks
that are aliated with a sector including great banks as their head institutions.
In times of restrictive monetary policy funds ow from these head institutions to
small banks which are now able to keep their loan portfolio relatively unaected
(Ehrmann and Worms, 2001). Thus, pass-through of large banks could be higher
or lower than that of small ones. The literature comes to conicting conclusions
regarding the relevance of size which is measured by total assets in determining
banks' heterogeneous loan supply reaction. Whereas Kashyap and Stein (1995,
1997) nd that size matters in the loan supply reaction of US banks, there is no
heterogeneous response according to size in the study of the four largest euro
area countries by Ehrmann et al. (2001). Besides this, Gambacorta (2005b) and
Worms (2001) derive the result that size is irrelevant for Italy and for Germany,
respectively. Kishan and Opiela (2000) on the other hand do nd that the
smallest (and least capitalised) banks have a stronger loan supply reaction.
Regarding the eect of size on interest rate pass-through Weth (2002) shows
that it has a signicant impact in Germany with large banks adjusting their
lending rates faster than smaller ones.
Another bank category of interest in determining heterogeneous behaviour
is the degree of diversication where it is dened as total income divided by in-
terest income. If the part of total income that derives from the original business
purpose of providing loans and accepting deposits is great, then a nancial in-
stitution will have to pass on changes in its renancing conditions more quickly.
In light of the recent turmoil on nancial markets and the distress caused
to banks by marked increases in money market rates, the relative volume of
loans to banks becomes an important determinant for interest rate pass-through.
MFIs with a large share of loans to banks in their portfolio are more concerned
about conditions on the money markets where most of this lending business
takes place. They feel more pressurised to pass on changes in these conditions
to their own products. Thus, the hypothesis is investigated that these credit
institutes adjust their rates more rapidly and to a larger extent. The exact
denition of the indicator employed here is loans and advances to banks divided
by total assets. To the author's knowledge no other study has tried to quantify
the eect of the relative amount of bank loans on either pass-through or loan
supply.
12All in all, 24 dierent categories10, related to banks' nancial structure were
examined but in the interest of brevity only results for the ones already men-
tioned will be presented: Liquidity, size, diversication and the relative volume
of loans to other banks.
Tables 2 to 5 present the results. The columns entitled Cat 1 and Cat 3
give the long-run pass-through rate and the short-run elasticity of banks in
category 1 and 3, respectively. The rst and second columns from the right
show the dierences in long- and short-run pass-through between categories 1
and 3 and are calculated as the rate and elasticity of category 3 banks minus
those of category 1 credit institutes. As expected, illiquid banks are quicker
to pass on market conditions to their retail rates and have an overall higher
degree of pass-through since they are not able to shield their customers from
market conditions by drawing on their liquid assets. For instance, liquid banks
in category 3 adjust their rate on other loans to households with an initial rate
xation of up to one year 31 percentage points less in the long-run and their
one-month elasticity is 83 percentage points lower. Thus, results for liquidity
are in line with the literature. Large banks exhibit a greater pass-through in
both the short and long run. The reason for this is possibly that small banks'
customers might rely more heavily on bank loans for nancing and thus small
banks compete less with market terms. Size therefore seems to matter in the
interest rate setting behaviour of German banks and our results conrm those
of Weth (2002), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 1997) and Kishan and Opiela (2000).
It can also be seen by looking at Table 4 that nancial institutions that are less
diversied and are thus in category 3 pass on movements in market rates more
swiftly and to a larger extent. This is in line with our expectations that these
banks will have to pass on changes in its renancing conditions more quickly.
The dierence, however, is only signicant for a few rates. Less diversied credit
institutes have incorporated, for example, 91 percent of a change in the market
rate in their price on deposits redeemable at a notice of over three months
in the long run compared to only 47 percent incorporated by diversied banks.
There is overwhelming evidence illustrated in Table 5 that credit institutes with
a relatively large volume of loans to other banks adjust their rates faster and
to a larger extent. The long-run pass-through dierence between category 3,
which contains the MFIs with a large share of loans to banks, and category
1 institutes, which are those with relatively few bank loans, is positive for 18
of 25 retail rates, 14 of which are signicant. In the short run the dierence
is positive for 21 rates although not as many are signicant. It is interesting
to note that those rates for which the dierence happens to be negative are
applied to deposit products. Banks that are heavily engaged in lending to other
banks are more dependent on market conditions and therefore quickly adjust
their product prices to reect changes in market developments.
10These categories can be divided into three broadly-dened groups according to rstly the
basic characteristics of a bank like its size and equity ratio, secondly its performance, e.g.
its return on assets and eciency, and lastly a bank's focus of business which includes its
diversication or degree of relationship banking.
136 Conclusion
Recent events following the diculties in the US sub-prime mortgage sector
have starkly demonstrated the vital importance of the interbank money market
and the nancial health of banks for the functioning of each economy. The
current credit crunch furthermore shows that there are dire consequences for
the economy if credit institutes do not pass on decreases in central bank rates
to their lending rates. The way retail bank rates behave in the largest euro area
country after movements in money market rates and how balance sheet factors
inuence their adjustment is thus worth investigating.
For Germany, the analysis with the new MFI interest rate statistics has
shown that long-run pass-through is not complete. This means that banks
do not fully pass on changes in policy. However, the short-run adjustment
was found to be often larger than the long-term one, especially for deposits.
The transmission parameters for these products exhibit a hump-shaped pattern
with regard to maturity for both households and rms. The same pattern is
distinguishable for loans to rms where a distinction can also be made according
to loan size. Loans over e1 million are adjusted faster and to a greater extent
than those up to e1 million. Regarding household loans, mortgages exhibit the
highest pass-through and interestingly banks had incorporated more of a change
in the market rate in these rates after one month than in the long run.
The results strongly indicate that MFIs dier substantially in the speed and
magnitude of their adjustment rates according to their balance sheet charac-
teristics. The size of a credit institutions is after all important. Large banks
exhibit a greater pass-through in both the short and long run than small ones,
which might be related to their diering customer structure and large institu-
tions having therefore to compete directly with market terms. Liquidity seems
another important factor in determining heterogeneous adjustment with illiquid
banks being quicker to pass on market conditions to their retail rates and hav-
ing an overall higher degree of pass-through. The degree of diversication, i.e.
how much of a bank's total income derives from the original business purpose
of providing loans and accepting deposits, also inuences MFIs' response and
banks that are less diversied pass on movements in market rates faster and to
a larger extent. In addition, pass-through is higher for banks that grant many
loans to other banks and therefore depend heavily on conditions on the market
where such lending takes place.
Even dierent banking groups adjust their rates heterogeneously with sav-
ings banks and credit cooperatives changing their rates more slowly than the
remaining banks, which might be explained by their dierent objectives as the
latter two groups are not strictly prot-maximising.
Whereas this study analyses the interest rate pass-through mechanism in
relatively stable times, it would be invaluable to examine the impact of the
credit crunch. Future research should investigate and quantify its inuence on
the rate adjustment behaviour of banks.
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18Table 2: Pass-through of Liquid and Illiquid Banks
Retail Market Long Run Short Run Dierence (3   1)
Rate Rate Cat 1 Cat 3 Cat 1 Cat 3 Long Run Short Run
Deposits { From households { Overnight
(1) EONIA 0:303 0:303 0:250 0:235  0:001  0:015
{ With agreed maturity :::
(2)  1 y EurIBOR 0:784 0:707 0:839 0:900  0:077 0:062
(3) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:799 0:860 0:700 0:925 0:061 0:225
(4) > 2 y Bearer 0:490 0:573 0:413 0:618 0:083 0:205
{ Redeemable at notice :::
(5)  3 m EurIBOR 0:064  0:007 0:226 0:257  0:071 0:032
(6) > 3 m EurIBOR 0:022 0:178 0:076 0:312 0:155 0:236
{ From rms { Overnight
(7) EONIA 0:341 0:430 0:397 0:421 0:090 0:024
{ With agreed maturity :::
(8)  1 y EurIBOR 0:879 0:864 1:132 0:909  0:015  0:223
(9) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:882 0:926 1:041 0:807 0:044  0:234
Loans { To households { Overdrafts
(12) EONIA 0:485 0:584 0:503 0:516 0:099 0:013
{ Consumer credit with an initial rate xation :::
(15) > 5 y Bearer 0:169 0:225  0:035 0:027 0:056 0:062
{ Housing loans with an initial rate xation :::
(16)  1 y EONIA 0:439 0:405 0:367 0:188  0:035  0:179
(17) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:609 0:588 0:395 0:381  0:020  0:013
(18) 5 y { 10 y Bearer 0:742 0:682 0:460 0:377  0:060  0:083
(19) > 10 y Bearer 0:976 0:839 0:659 0:383  0:137  0:276
{ Other loans with an initial rate xation :::
(20)  1 y EONIA 0:636 0:330 0:915 0:090  0:307  0:825
(21) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:390 0:348 0:322 0:217  0:042  0:105
(22) > 5 y Bearer 0:565 0:394 0:232 0:181  0:171  0:051
{ To rms { Overdrafts
(23) EONIA 0:094 0:526  0:136 0:499 0:432 0:634
{ Loans up to e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(24)  1 y EONIA 0:740 0:635 0:629 0:505  0:105  0:124
(25) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:505 0:555 0:390 0:391 0:050 0:001
(26) > 5 y Bearer 0:547 0:385 0:208 0:024  0:162  0:184
{ Loans over e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(27)  1 y EONIA 0:895 0:962 0:839 0:610 0:067  0:230
(28) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:642 0:410 0:252 0:466  0:232 0:214
(29) > 5 y Bearer 0:545 0:525 0:682 0:561  0:020  0:121
19Table 3: Pass-through of Large and Small Banks
Retail Market Long Run Short Run Dierence (3   1)
Rate Rate Cat 1 Cat 3 Cat 1 Cat 3 Long Run Short Run
Deposits { From households { Overnight
(1) EONIA 0:277 0:258 0:275 0:121  0:018  0:154
{ With agreed maturity :::
(2)  1 y EurIBOR 0:710 0:802 0:851 0:763 0:092  0:088
(3) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:833 0:766 0:919 0:520  0:067  0:399
(4) > 2 y Bearer 0:544 0:492 0:587 0:370  0:052  0:217
{ Redeemable at notice :::
(5)  3 m EurIBOR 0:002 0:097 0:200 0:261 0:095 0:061
(6) > 3 m EurIBOR 0:089  0:066 0:255 0:097  0:155  0:158
{ From rms { Overnight
(7) EONIA 0:302 0:467 0:273 0:566 0:165 0:293
{ With agreed maturity :::
(8)  1 y EurIBOR 0:828 0:908 1:027 1:124 0:080 0:097
(9) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:871 0:945 0:759 0:955 0:074 0:195
Loans { To households { Overdrafts
(12) EONIA 0:523 0:501 0:421 0:543  0:022 0:123
{ Consumer credit with an initial rate xation :::
(15) > 5 y Bearer 0:345 0:254 0:177  0:031  0:091  0:207
{ Housing loans with an initial rate xation :::
(16)  1 y EONIA 0:267 0:661 0:008 0:679 0:394 0:670
(17) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:549 0:692 0:392 0:417 0:142 0:026
(18) 5 y { 10 y Bearer 0:671 0:741 0:368 0:465 0:070 0:098
(19) > 10 y Bearer 0:861 0:924 0:376 0:664 0:063 0:288
{ Other loans with an initial rate xation :::
(20)  1 y EONIA 0:369 0:841 0:262 0:737 0:472 0:475
(21) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:413 0:565 0:320 0:646 0:152 0:326
(22) > 5 y Bearer 0:399 0:652 0:131 0:334 0:253 0:203
{ To rms { Overdrafts
(23) EONIA 0:306 0:179 0:492  0:042  0:127  0:534
{ Loans up to e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(24)  1 y EONIA 0:487 0:878 0:539 0:988 0:392 0:449
(25) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:540 0:610 0:358 0:547 0:069 0:189
(26) > 5 y Bearer 0:422 0:539 0:037 0:205 0:117 0:168
{ Loans over e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(27)  1 y EONIA 0:996 0:929 1:061 0:808  0:067  0:254
(28) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:287 0:698  0:316 0:517 0:411 0:833
(29) > 5 y Bearer 0:308 0:680  0:395 0:627 0:372 1:022
20Table 4: Pass-through of Diversied and Less Diversied Banks
Retail Market Long Run Short Run Dierence (3   1)
Rate Rate Cat 1 Cat 3 Cat 1 Cat 3 Long Run Short Run
Deposits { From households { Overnight
(1) EONIA 0:306 0:550 0:240 0:286 0:244 0:046
{ With agreed maturity :::
(2)  1 y EurIBOR 0:717 0:921 0:826 1:020 0:204 0:194
(3) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:591 0:704 0:659 0:789 0:113 0:130
(4) > 2 y Bearer 0:662 0:796 0:461 0:666 0:135 0:205
{ Redeemable at notice :::
(5)  3 m EurIBOR 0:408 0:469 0:186 0:348 0:062 0:162
(6) > 3 m EurIBOR 0:467 0:906 0:158 0:283 0:439 0:125
{ From rms { Overnight
(7) EONIA 0:310 0:450 0:381 0:395 0:140 0:014
{ With agreed maturity :::
(8)  1 y EurIBOR 0:980 1:041 0:984 1:163 0:062 0:179
(9) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:528 0:720 0:743 1:184 0:192 0:441
Loans { To households { Overdrafts
(12) EONIA 0:950 0:327 0:842 0:531  0:623  0:311
{ Consumer credit with an initial rate xation :::
(15) > 5 y Bearer 0:449 0:413 0:095 0:178  0:036 0:083
{ Housing loans with an initial rate xation :::
(16)  1 y EONIA 0:809 0:687 0:923 0:784  0:123  0:138
(17) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:572 0:646 0:377 0:432 0:074 0:055
(18) 5 y { 10 y Bearer 0:784 0:833 0:477 0:526 0:049 0:049
(19) > 10 y Bearer 0:812 0:873 0:586 0:729 0:061 0:143
{ Other loans with an initial rate xation :::
(20)  1 y EONIA 1:165 0:723 1:947 1:097  0:442  0:850
(21) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:287 0:491 0:172 0:432 0:204 0:260
(22) > 5 y Bearer 0:501 0:835 0:048 0:406 0:334 0:357
{ To rms { Overdrafts
(23) EONIA 1:164 0:543 0:345 0:465  0:622 0:119
{ Loans up to e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(24)  1 y EONIA 0:604 0:660 0:602 0:619 0:056 0:017
(25) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:616 0:508 0:425 0:411  0:108  0:015
(26) > 5 y Bearer 0:560 0:605 0:223 0:178 0:045  0:044
{ Loans over e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(27)  1 y EONIA 0:880 0:726 0:681 0:944  0:155 0:263
(28) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:386 0:394 0:241 0:511 0:008 0:271
(29) > 5 y Bearer 0:755 0:729 0:632 0:509  0:026  0:123
21Table 5: Pass-through of Active and Less Active Banks in the Interbank Market
Retail Market Long Run Short Run Dierence (3   1)
Rate Rate Cat 1 Cat 3 Cat 1 Cat 3 Long Run Short Run
Deposits { From households { Overnight
(1) EONIA 0:280 0:261 0:260 0:147  0:018  0:113
{ With agreed maturity :::
(2)  1 y EurIBOR 0:710 0:802 0:708 1:007 0:092 0:299
(3) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:823 0:790 0:890 0:697  0:033  0:192
(4) > 2 y Bearer 0:563 0:525 0:604 0:395  0:039  0:210
{ Redeemable at notice :::
(5)  3 m EurIBOR  0:047 0:166 0:200 0:358 0:213 0:158
(6) > 3 m EurIBOR 0:173  0:081 0:216 0:129  0:254  0:087
{ From rms { Overnight
(7) EONIA 0:296 0:506 0:297 0:553 0:210 0:256
{ With agreed maturity :::
(8)  1 y EurIBOR 0:845 0:923 0:896 1:282 0:077 0:386
(9) 1 y { 2 y Bearer 0:922 0:907 0:178 0:981  0:016 0:803
Loans { To households { Overdrafts
(12) EONIA 0:447 0:383 0:432 0:549  0:064 0:117
{ Consumer credit with an initial rate xation :::
(15) > 5 y Bearer 0:217 0:403 0:036 0:202 0:186 0:166
{ Housing loans with an initial rate xation :::
(16)  1 y EONIA 0:387 0:535 0:300 0:707 0:147 0:406
(17) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:562 0:674 0:391 0:416 0:112 0:025
(18) 5 y { 10 y Bearer 0:671 0:735 0:334 0:440 0:064 0:106
(19) > 10 y Bearer 0:859 0:874 0:373 0:611 0:015 0:238
{ Other loans with an initial rate xation :::
(20)  1 y EONIA 0:441 0:762 0:543 0:688 0:321 0:145
(21) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:361 0:572 0:125 0:591 0:211 0:466
(22) > 5 y Bearer 0:463 0:587 0:129 0:222 0:124 0:092
{ To rms { Overdrafts
(23) EONIA 0:182 0:281 0:037 0:263 0:099 0:226
{ Loans up to e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(24)  1 y EONIA 0:667 0:825 0:409 0:992 0:158 0:583
(25) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:481 0:593 0:382 0:457 0:113 0:076
(26) > 5 y Bearer 0:437 0:551 0:183 0:222 0:114 0:039
{ Loans over e1 million with an initial rate xation :::
(27)  1 y EONIA 0:938 0:932 0:385 0:984  0:006 0:599
(28) 1 y { 5 y Bearer 0:527 0:685 0:160 0:618 0:158 0:459
(29) > 5 y Bearer 0:416 0:646 0:234 0:516 0:230 0:281
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